



Recent questions and comments received by this
Bank from bankers, attorneys and consultants have
indicated a keen interest in the definition and struc-
ture of large banking markets in the Fifth District.
These individuals seldom express an interest in the
fine points of economic theory. They do seem vitally
concerned with the practical aspects of banking mar-
ket analysis including the role of thrift institutions.
Awareness of thrift competition in some markets
may extend well beyond the Supreme Court’s land-
mark U. S. vs. Philadelphia National Bank decision
in 1963, which established that the antitrust laws
were applicable to the banking industry. The Phila-
delphia National case also established that commer-
cial banking constituted a unique cluster of financial
services (the line of commerce or product) which was
provided in a local area, the geographic market.
There was no place for thrifts in this market struc-
ture as defined by the courts.
Twenty-three years after the precedent setting
Philadelphia National Bank decision, this article
briefly outlines the current approach to competitive
analysis as applied to bank acquisitions. Then it
proceeds to a detailed examination of the ten largest
banking markets in the Fifth District. Thrift compe-
tition is recognized as a major factor in each of these
markets. It is also evident that the current regula-
tory framework presents no barrier to most potential
acquisitions in these areas, whether or not thrifts are
included in the analysis.
Geographic Market
Since Philadelphia National, the Supreme Court
has consistently maintained that the relevant geo-
graphic market is the local banking market. This
concept has been interpreted as implying that the
banking requirements of the locally limited customer,
especially the locally limited borrower, are significant
determinants in geographic market definition. In
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economic terms, the limit of the geographic market
is related to the marginal cost which a locally limited
customer might incur if he attempted to obtain bank-
ing services at some distance from his residence or
place of work. Clearly there is a practical limit in
terms of time, effort or expense that would preclude
most individuals and small commercial enterprises
from pursuing banking services at distant locations.
Recent concerns expressed by consumers with respect
to “lifeline” or “basic” banking services have indi-
cated that many persons do not have access to a
national financial services market and, in fact, are
highly dependent on local banking services.
Court decisions since 1963 have continued to em-
phasize the importance of the local banking market.
There also has been increasing recognition that a
banking market may cross political boundaries. While
this possibility had been recognized at times in the
past, it became more firmly established with the
Board of Governors’ (Board) determination in 1980
that the Ranally Metro Area (RMA)
1 often pro-
vides a reasonable approximation of the banking
market. RMAs typically are growth areas contain-
ing expanding banking markets. State/federal road
building activities and other projects designed to
remove physical obstacles to transportation and com-
merce also contribute to the expansion of banking
markets in some communities.
A consistent pattern of decisions by the various
regulatory agencies and the courts has established
that the geographic definition of a local banking
market as set forth by the U. S. Supreme Court in
the Philadelphia National case has not been influ-
enced materially by subsequent economic, techno-
logical or legislative developments. These same three
processes have tended to alter the applicable defini-
tion of the product market.
1 An RMA is defined by Rand McNally as “(1) a central
city or cities; (2) any adjacent continuously built-up
areas; and (3) other communities ... if at least 8 percent
of the population or 20 percent of its labor force com-
mutes to the central city and its adjacent built-up areas”
and the population density is at least 70 per square mile
unless undergoing rapid development. Most areas with a
total population of 40,000 or more are included.
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What is the unique cluster of banking services
that the Supreme Court first determined represents a
product market? The essential services include the
acceptance of demand deposits and the granting of
commercial loans. One need not provide the com-
plete assortment of products offered by a full service
bank in order to comply with the Court’s require-
ments.
The thrift industry, specifically savings and loan
associations, obtained access to demand deposits
(NOW accounts) with the enactment of the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 and began to formally participate in
commercial lending with the passage of the Garn-
St Germain Act in 1982. Credit unions also can
provide NOW accounts but most CUs in this District
continue to accommodate a restricted membership
base which is not comparable to the broad market
segment served by commercial banks and S&Ls.
Adherence to the usual requirement that membership
in a credit union is a necessary qualification for bor-
rowing almost automatically blocks most forms of
commercial lending activity for CUs.
It is quite possible that further technological de-
velopments and legislative changes will admit addi-
tional participants to the product market, including
such closely related suppliers of financial services as
consumer finance companies, brokerage firms and
large nationwide retailing establishments such as
Sears. Regardless of the changes which may take
place in the list of competitors, it is the product
definition and not the geographic market which is
most immediately affected.
Total Deposits as a “Product”
The Court’s emphasis on deposit services is re-
flected in the way banking analysts measure all prod-
uct offerings. It has become customary to use total
deposits as a proxy for many forms of competition in
the banking market. Total deposits are taken to be
representative of most of the services customarily
attributed to the liability side of a bank’s balance
sheet, although they do not address directly the
products in the asset category. Moreover, deposit
data meet a crucial criterion for practical analysis in
that they are the only measures readily available. By
contrast, asset data comparable to the Summary of
Deposits information compiled by the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation for banks and by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board for thrifts are
simply not available.
Currently there seems to be general agreement
among the various federal regulatory agencies and
the U. S. Department of Justice that thrifts are
significant competitors of commercial banks. There
are differing views, however, concerning the precise
degree of competition between thrifts and commercial
banks. In other words, there is evidence that thrifts
may be somewhat reluctant to use their recently
approved powers, particularly when it comes to
making commercial loans. In the absence of infor-
mation effectively documenting the competitive ac-
tivities of thrift institutions, the Board usually will
include 50 percent of the deposits held by thrifts as a
component of the relevant banking market. This
adjustment is tacitly acknowledged to represent a
rule of thumb that may be revised when circum-
stances warrant.
The Justice Department takes a somewhat differ-
ent tack by dividing markets into wholesale and
retail segments. One hundred percent of thrift
deposits is normally included in the retail (con-
sumer) market as defined, while in general only 20
percent of thrift deposits is attributed to the whole-
sale (commercial) market because of the limited
ability of thrifts to engage in commercial lending. It
should be noted that Justice and the FDIC tend to
place greater emphasis on deposits of individuals,
partnerships and corporations (IPC deposits) than
on total deposits when computing market shares.
Measuring Competition in the Market
The concepts of geographic market and the rele-
vant product market say nothing about the degree of
competition in the market. Traditionally the degree
of competition in banking markets has been measured
by deposit concentration ratios-typically the three-
firm or the four-firm deposit concentration ratios.
As an example, if the four largest banks in a market
control an aggregate of 80 percent of deposits in the
area, the four-firm concentration ratio will be 80
percent. This piece of information does not tell us
whether the remaining 20 percent is held by one bank
or a hundred. The original Department of Justice
guidelines published in 1968 were based on concen-
tration ratios.
An alternative and perhaps more informative
means of measuring concentration is represented by
the Herfindahl Index (HI). The HI takes its name
from Orris Herfindahl, a researcher in the early
1950s who employed the measure in his studies of
concentration in the steel industry. At approximately
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veloped a similar measurement and the HI therefore
is often identified as the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) .
The HHI may be defined simply as the sum of the
squares of the respective market shares.
2 For ex-
ample, an isolated market with only one vendor
holding one hundred percent of the market would
exemplify complete monopoly. One hundred percent
expressed as a decimal equivalent of 1.00 multiplied
by itself ( 1.00 x 1.00) would remain one or unity
which is the theoretical upper limit of the HHI.
As a more realistic illustration, a bank controlling
50 percent of a market would have an HHI of .2500
(.50
2 or .50 x .50) and its competitor with 25 percent
would indicate an HHI of .0625 (.25
2). Allocating
the remaining market share of 25 percent to a third
bank would yield a market HHI of .3750 (.2500 +
.0625 + .0625). It has become accepted practice to
convert the decimals into a whole number by multi-
plying by 10,000. A feature of the HHI is that it
disproportionally weights the larger participants in
the market and may give a more accurate indication
of relative competitive ability.
Justice Guidelines
The HHI acquired official status when the U. S.
Department of Justice published its revised “Merger
Guidelines” on June 14, 1982. The guidelines divide
markets into three broad categories. Those with a
post-merger HHI below 1000 are classified as un-
concentrated, a post-merger HHI between 1000 and
1800 is moderately concentrated and anything over
1800 is considered highly concentrated. Merger-
induced changes in the HHI are at least as important
as the static level of the index. With respect to such
changes, Justice notes that “the department is likely
to challenge mergers in this region that produce an
increase in the HHI of 100 points or more.”
The guidelines recently have been further liberal-
ized with respect to bank consolidations. In an
advisory opinion to the Comptroller concerning the
acquisition of Brookhaven Bank and Trust Company
by First National Bank of Jackson, Jackson, Missis-
sippi, Justice has indicated that it will not challenge a
bank merger unless two conditions are met. The
2 The HHI may be represented mathematically as
      MS   ,  where MS, is the market share of bank i and
i=1
n is the number of banks in the market.
market after consummation of the merger must have
an HHI of 1800 or more and the rise in the HHI
attributed to the merger must equal or exceed 200
points. This expansion of the guidelines constitutes
implicit recognition as described by Justice that there
are other near-bank competitors in the typical bank-
ing market which cannot be evaluated adequately
from readily available information.
The guidelines provide some of the formal dimen-
sions of the legal barriers which circumscribe bank
acquisitions. These official rules are particularly
interesting when applied to the ten largest banking
markets in the District.
Fifth District Banking Markets
Table I lists the top ten banking markets in the
Fifth District arrayed in descending order of total
deposits from the Washington (D. C.) RMA, the
largest, to the Charleston, West Virginia market
consisting of Kanawha County and Putnam County,
West Virginia. Thrifts are a significant factor in
each of these ten markets ranging from 51.0 percent
of combined deposits in the Greenville, South Caro-
lina market to 15.4 percent in the Charleston, West.
Virginia market on June 30, 1983. The Charleston.
and the Charlotte, North Carolina markets are the
only areas among the top ten where thrifts control
less than 25 percent of aggregate deposits.
Thrifts managed to maintain and slightly improve
their share of deposits in the universe of ten markets
between June 30, 1983 and mid-year 1984 (the most:
recent period for which data are available) as illus-
trated by the 37.7 percent weighted average in Table
II compared with the 37.6 percent average of Table I.
Thrift market share rose from 15.4 percent to 15.9
percent in the Charleston market but declined
slightly in Greenville from 51.0 percent to 50.1
percent. The remaining markets where the thrifts’
share declined over the year included Richmond,
Virginia ; Charlotte, North Carolina ; Norfolk-Ports-
mouth, Virginia ; Winston-Salem, North Carolina ;
Wake County, North Carolina and the remainder
of the Raleigh RMA. These decreases were
effectively offset by incremental shifts in favor of
the thrifts in the markets of Washington, D. C. ;
Baltimore, Maryland ; and Columbia, South Carolina.
This performance is consistent with the view that
where thrifts have been strong historically, they re-
main viable competitors. The slight changes in
market share data show, however, that thrifts have
not gained an appreciable competitive advantage rela-
tive to commercial banks in these markets.
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TOP TEN BANKING MARKETS
FIFTH DISTRICT
June 30, 1983







Washington, D. C. RMA
Baltimore, Md. RMA
Richmond, Va. RMA
Charlotte, N. C. RMA
Norfolk-Portsmouth, Va. RMA and
Currituck County, N. C.
Columbia, S. C. RMA
Greenville, S. C. RMA
Wake County, N. C. and remainder of
Raleigh RMA
Winston-Salem, N. C. RMA
Kanawha County and Putnam County,
W. Va. (Charleston RMA)
Total
Ten Market Weighted Average
$17,246,510 $11,869,032 $29,115,542 40.8
9,025,600 5,854,700 14,880,300 39.3
3,954,119 1,976,454 5,930,573 33.3
3,884,110 1,120,048 5,004,158 22.4
2,352,062 1,913,804 4,265,866 44.8
1,729,697 1,015,453 2,745,150 37.0
1,157,771 1,204,253 2,362,024 51.0
1,635,471 608,773 2,244,244 27.1









TOP TEN BANKING MARKETS
FIFTH DISTRICT
June 30, 1984







Washington, D. C. RMA
Baltimore, Md. RMA
Richmond, Va. RMA
Charlotte, N. C. RMA
Norfolk-Portsmouth, Va. RMA and
Currituck County, N. C.
Columbia, S. C. RMA
Winston-Salem, N. C. RMA
Wake County, N. C. and remainder of
Raleigh RMA
Greenville, S. C. RMA
Kanawha County and Putnam County,
W. Va. (Charleston RMA)
Total

























5Concentration varies widely among the top ten
markets as depicted in Table III. The HHIs for
these markets range from a low of just 682 for the
narrowly defined market consisting of banks only in
Washington to a high of 4538 in the Winston-Salem
area. Other highly concentrated markets with an
HHI above 1800 include Richmond, Charlotte,
Norfolk, Portsmouth and Columbia.
Expansion of the product market to include 50
percent of thrift deposits in the area brings about a
striking decrease in the perceived level of concen-
tration. After this adjustment the HHI would range
from 414 for Washington to 3282 for Winston-
Salem. The only market other than Winston-Salem
which would remain highly concentrated under this
definition is the Charlotte market with an HHI of
2231. The addition of just half of the deposits attrib-
utable to thrifts has lowered the indicated Herfindahl
by 203 points in the Charleston market and by vari-
ous amounts in the other markets ranging upward to
an impressive 1256 in the Winston-Salem area.
These substantive reductions in market concentration
represent empirical evidence that as competitors
thrifts indeed do matter.
The last column of Table III shows the effect of
adding 20 percent of thrift deposits to the market.
This computation approximates the weighting which
Justice has indicated it is willing to consider when
evaluating the commercial banking market. Even
with this relatively small weight, thrift competition
is still sufficient to remove most markets from the
highly concentrated category. Charlotte and Winston-
Salem again are the only markets which remain con-
centrated after this adjustment. These results con-
stitute evidence that concentration is simply not a
material problem in most of the top ten banking
markets in the District once even the slightest weight
is given to deposits of thrift institutions.
While space considerations preclude a detailed
look at each of the ten large markets, one can examine
more closely the market for Washington, D. C. and
the adjacent portions of Maryland and Virginia. As
mentioned previously, the Washington RMA is by
far the largest and least concentrated banking market
in the District.
Table A of the Appendix lists each of the 71 banks
which compete in the Washington banking market.
On June 30, 1984 these organizations operated 917
banking offices holding total deposits of $20.2 billion.
The aggregate HHI was a remarkably low 682 with
the contribution of each institution to that overall
figure apparent from the data. The modest level of
concentration was further confirmed by the three-
and four-bank deposit concentration ratios of only
34.4 percent and 43.6 percent, respectively.
Table B shows the dramatic effect of adding all
Table III





Herfindahl Above (+) or Herfindahl and 50 percent and 20 percent
Index- Below (-) the Index-Banks of Thrift of Thrift
Markets Banks Only 1800 Guideline and Thrifts Deposits Deposits
Washington, D. C. RMA 682 -1118 337 414 533
Baltimore, Md. RMA 1242 -588 510 709 958
Richmond, Va. RMA 1980 +180 1055 1355 1671
Charlotte, N. C. RMA 2858 + 1058 1836 2231 2571
Norfolk-Portsmouth, Va. RMA and
Currituck County, N. C. 2046 + 246 981 1241 1609
Columbia, S. C. RMA 2059 + 259 1126 1331 1659
Winston-Salem, N. C. RMA 4538 + 2738 2611 3282 3936
Wake County, N. C. and remainder of
Raleigh RMA 1425 - 375 999 1107 1261
Greenville, S. C. RMA 1601 -199 1368 1141 1218
Kanawha County and Putnam County,
W. Va. (Charleston RMA) 1405 - 395 1093 1202 1310
6 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1986thrift deposits in the area to the market. Under this
scenario some 122 banks and thrifts operate 1323
offices. Collectively they hold $34.3 billion in de-
posits. The HHI has been halved to 337, while the
respective three-bank and four-bank deposit concen-
tration ratios have been reduced correspondingly to
20.5 percent and 27.0 percent from the year earlier
levels of 34.4 percent and 43.6 percent. The hypo-
thetical merger of the two largest institutions in this
expanded product market would add less than 100
points to the HHI.
Although it is not shown here, an alternative market
definition to include 50 percent of thrift deposits has
been computed by the author.
3 This arbitrary adjust-
ment reduces the HHI to 414. The merger of the two
largest institutions as defined would now add about
149 points to the HHI. This change, of course, would
not conflict in any way with applicable guidelines.
Also not shown is the author’s reconfiguration of
the data to determine the effect of reducing thrift
deposits to a mere 20 percent of the deposits reported
by these institutions. The HHI rises moderately to
533 after this adjustment. Combining the two largest
institutions in the market would increase the indi-
cated HHI by approximately 209. An increase of
this magnitude evidently would be thoroughly accept-
able under published guidelines in such an unconcen-
trated market.
Summary
Thrifts and banks compete in local banking mar-
kets with product lines that are similar but not identi-
cal between the two industries. Competition among
the firms in a market is measured by deposit concen-
tration ratios and most recently by HHIs. The HHI
provides the basis for the Department of Justice’s
Merger Guidelines.
A review of the top ten banking markets in the
Fifth District has demonstrated that most of these
markets are either unconcentrated or near the lower
boundary of the moderately concentrated range after
giving some weight to the presence of thrift institu-
tions. The relatively low concentration levels indicate
that existing guidelines do not present a significant
barrier to bank acquisitions in these communities.
3 Unpublished market tables for the markets cited in this
article are available from the author upon request.
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These market tables have been compiled from data sources which
are generally reliable but have not proved to be infallible. If any
reader has reason to believe that the information presented for his
or her organization is not reported accurately, your comments
directed to the author at the address shown on the back cover of
this publication would be most welcome. Your thoughts concerning
the usefulness of the data in your activities would also be helpful
in providing guidance with respect to information for other markets
which might be published in the future.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 910 ECONOMIC REVIEW, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1986